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In his extensive work on the theories of myth, Robert Segal makes a broad distinction 
between nineteenth-century theories, which saw myths as primitive attempts to 
explain the physical world and hence as now superseded by modern science, and 
twentieth-century theories of myth, which saw myths as serving other purposes than 
explanation of the physical world and hence as not necessarily incompatible with 
modern science. Segal suggests that the challenge for twenty-first century theories of 
myth is to find ways of seeing myths as explanatory of the physical world in a way 
that is also compatible with modern science. The present chapter focuses on one such 
approach that Segal discusses: Carl Gustav Jung’s psychological theory of myth when 
it is allied with his concept of synchronicity. After clarifying the criteria that need to 
be satisfied for, in Segal’s phrase, ‘bringing myth back to the world’, the chapter 
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Throughout his extensive writings on myth, Robert Segal makes a broad 
categorization of theories of myth by century. For nineteenth-century theories, 
typified by those of Edward Tylor (1832-1917) and James Frazer (1854-1941), myth 
was an attempt to explain (or, in Frazer’s case, describe) the external world and was 
deemed by the theorists to be incompatible with science (Segal 2003b: 598-601). 
Because of the incontestable explanatory success of science, myth was considered to 
have been superseded and to be no longer a viable option for people in the modern 
world. For twentieth-century theories, by contrast, typified by those of, for example, 
Bronislaw Malinowski (1884-1942), Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), Carl Gustav Jung 
(1875-1961), Rudolf Bultmann (1884-1976), Hans Jonas (1903-1993), and Mircea 
Eliade (1907-1986), myth was considered to serve other purposes than explanation of 
the physical world: for instance, social, psychological, or existential purposes (Segal 
2003b: 601-607; 2015b). As non-explanatory and/or not about the physical world, 
myth was not considered to be in direct competition with science and therefore not to 
be incompatible with science. In relation to these theories, myth could be a viable way 
of thinking even for people in the modern world (Segal 2003b: 600). 
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Segal suggests that one of the main challenges for theorists in the twenty-first 
century is to find ways of understanding myth in which myth is both explanatory of 
the physical world, as for most theorists in the nineteenth century, and genuinely 
compatible with science, as for most theorists in the twentieth century. Meeting this 
challenge would constitute ‘bringing myth back to the world’ (2000: 18; 2008). 
 
Segal considers a variety of possible theories that might achieve this, 
including ones based on Claude Lévi-Strauss’s (1908-2009) structuralist anthropology 
(Segal 2000: 16-18; 2015b: 26-28, 100-106), James Lovelock’s (1919-) Gaia 
hypothesis (2015a, 2015b), and Donald Winnicott’s (1896-1971) notion of ‘playing as 
reality’ (2000: 18-24; 2004: 137-42). Another possibility Segal has considered is 
Jung’s theory of myth when it takes on board the implications of his concept of 
synchronicity (1998: 20-21; 2008: 200-3). It is this last possibility that I shall mainly 
discuss in the present chapter. 
 
From Segal’s discussions of the candidate theories, in particular from the 
points on which he faults them, it emerges that, for him, a theory that fully brought 
myth back to the world would satisfy three criteria: first, it would involve causally 
effective divine personalities (1998: 20; 2015b: 125); second, it would explain the 
physical world (2008: 102-103; 2015b: 124); and third, it would remain compatible 
with modern science (2000:17; 2008: 100). It is worth considering how the different 
theories fare against these criteria. I shall briefly look at Segal’s assessments of the 
theories of Lévi-Strauss, Lovelock, and Winnicott, before discussing in more detail 
Jung’s theory of myth when combined with his concept of synchronicity. 
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First, however, it is important to clarify in relation to the second criterion that, 
although Segal refers at different times to bringing myth back to ‘the world’, to ‘the 
external world’, and to ‘the physical world’, he does mean in all cases specifically the 
physical world and not the social world or cultural world, let alone the psychological 
world. For example, in the 2004 edition of his book Myth: A Very Short Introduction, 
after discussing an example of the ‘rags to riches myth’ (2004: 139-140), he notes, as 
a limitation of his example, that in it the myth ‘is still about the social world and not 
about the physical one’. He then goes on to discuss cases where the myths involve 
effects on the physical world (2004: 140). Tellingly, too, in the 2015 revision of his 
book the key statement from the 2004 edition that ‘In the twenty-first century the 
question is whether myth can be brought back to the external world — without 
facilely dismissing the authority of science’ (2004: 138) is repeated almost identically 
except that the phrase ‘external world’ has been replaced with ‘physical world’ (2015: 
123). 
 
One might ask what is the need for Segal’s challenge and its stringent criteria. 
Have not twentieth-century theories of myth, in identifying other purposes for myth 
than explanation of the physical world, already satisfactorily resolved the question of 
the continuing value of myth in the contemporary world? The key, I think, lies in 
Segal’s phrase ‘without facilely dismissing the authority of science’. Twentieth-
century myths, in Segal’s account, achieved their compatibility with science by re-
characterizing myth (2015b: 122). Myth bowed before ‘the authority of science’; 
theories of myth ‘circumvent the issue’ of being in conflict with science (2008: 102). 
Alternative approaches of achieving reconciliation between myth and science through 
‘relativizing’, ‘sociologizing’, ‘feminizing’, or ‘mythicizing’ science are scathingly 
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rejected by Segal as ‘easy routes’ (2015b: 122). The challenge Segal formulates for 
twenty-first century theories of myth is one in which myth, in fully-fledged form as 
involving causally effective divine personalities, is invited to show that it can hold its 
own in face of the authority of modern science. Is there a way in which reconciliation 
can be achieved between myth and science that is compatible with the strongest 
claims for both? Whatever the answer, in framing the question Segal prompts a 
deepening of reflection on the nature of myth and its possible role in contemporary 
worldviews. 
 
Before examining in detail the case of Jung’s theory, it is worth looking 
briefly at some other theories discussed by Segal as candidates for bringing myth back 
to the world. From these examples it will become clear how difficult it is to satisfy 
simultaneously all three of Segal’s criteria. 
 
In Lévi-Strauss’s structuralist anthropological theory of myth, according to 
which myths are attempts to resolve or temper contradictions between natural and 
cultural phenomena (1955), myths can certainly involve divine personalities (1955: 
433, 437, 439) and they do explain the physical world in a way that, in its own terms, 
is rational and arguably scientific (1955: 444). But myths for Lévi-Strauss are not 
compatible with modern science, since, as Segal summarises, they explain the world 
in terms of the (primitive) ‘science of the concrete’, which focuses on ‘the observable, 
sensory, qualitative aspects of natural phenomena’ rather than in terms of the 
(modern) science of the abstract, which focuses on ‘the unobservable, nonsensory, 
quantitative’ aspects of natural phenomena (Segal 2000: 16-17; see also 2008: 
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103n2). Lévi-Strauss’s structural approach to myth thus satisfies the first and second 
of Segal’s criteria but fails to satisfy the third. 
 
In the case of Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis (later more boldly called the Gaia 
theory), the myth in question does involve a causally effective divine personality, 
namely, the Greek goddess Gaia. The hypothesis also purports to explain the physical 
world, that is, how the earth (‘Gaia’) maintains through self-regulation a ‘highly 
improbable atmosphere’ that can support life (Segal 2015b: 124). And, although the 
Gaia hypothesis is a highly controversial idea, a defensible case can be made for its 
compatibility with modern science (Lovelock, a Fellow of the Royal Society since 
1974, has evidently been considered by his peers to be a highly credible scientist). At 
first blush, Lovelock’s hypothesis or theory thus seems to satisfy all three of Segal’s 
criteria. However, Segal notes that in his later work Lovelock has clarified that he is 
using Gaia as a metaphor and is ‘not […] thinking of the Earth as alive in a sentient 
way, or even alive like an animal or a bacterium’ (quoted in Segal 2015b: 124-125). 
For Segal, this means that Lovelock is not in the end seeing the earth as a personality, 
since the earth, not being alive, has no ‘intent’; and not being a personality, the earth 
is neither a god nor the subject of a myth (Segal 2015b: 125). The Gaia hypothesis 
thus ultimately fails to satisfy Segal’s first criterion of involving causally effective 
divine personalities. 
 
In the perspective that Segal (2000: 18-24; 2004: 138-142) develops from 
Winnicott’s ideas about play, myth is seen as a form of ‘make-believe’, where 
adherents view the world mythologically even though they recognize that in reality it 
is not mythological (Segal 2004: 139). The example Segal ingeniously elaborates is of 
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fans treating Hollywood stars and other celebrities ‘as if’ they were gods and 
goddesses (2000: 21-24; 2004: 140-142). When viewed as make-believe, myths can 
involve causally effective ‘divine’ personalities (2000: 23), and those engaging in this 
kind of perception can also fully accept modern science when outside of the make-
believe. There is even a sense in which happenings in the physical world can be 
explained as having been caused by behaviour of the make-believe gods and 
goddesses: for example, when the celebrities campaign ‘to end pollution, curb global 
warming, and save species’ (Segal 2004: 140). It therefore again looks as though the 
approach based on Winnicott’s ideas about play and ‘make-believe’ satisfies all three 
of Segal’s criteria. However, although Segal doesn’t draw attention to this, there is 
surely a significant limitation in the ‘explaining’ of the physical world that can be 
done within this perspective, inasmuch as being a cause of effects in the physical 
world through being the figurehead of a campaign is not the same as explaining the 
nature and processes of the physical world in the kind of way modern science does. 
Indeed, it seems more like an effect on the social world, inasmuch as the mentioned 
campaigns primarily address human beliefs and behaviours in an attempt to reverse or 
retard the effects of previous human beliefs and behaviours. Ultimately, therefore, this 
approach only satisfies the second criterion in a limited way, if at all.  
 
Each of the above three theories fails to satisfy one or other of Segal’s three 
criteria: Lévi-Strauss’s fails to satisfy the third, Lovelock’s the first, and Winnicott’s 




Although Jung made no attempt to present a systematic theory of myth, 
sometimes explicitly denying that he had any intention to do so (1911-12/1952: 
xxviii-xxix), his writings are replete with references to and discussions of myths and a 
coherent and largely consistent, though evolving, theory of myth can be extracted 
from them. This theory is, in brief, that myths are autonomously arising but culturally 
elaborated expressions of archetypes of the collective unconscious (Walker 1995, 
Segal 1998). Segal, more than any other commentator, has teased out the details of 
this implicit theory of myth and has set it in the wider comparative context of other 
late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century theories of myth (Segal 1998, 1999, 
2003a, 2003b, 2008, 2010, 2011). From these comparisons Jung’s theory emerges as 
one of the few to address each of the three main questions that, according to Segal, 
can be asked of myth: ‘what is its subject matter, what is its origin, and what is its 
function?’ (1998: 3). In Segal’s account, the subject matter of myth for Jung is the 
human mind, specifically the collective unconscious; the origin of myth is the initial 
need for contact with this aspect of the mind; and the function of myth is the 
maintaining or renewing of such contact (1998: 3-21). 
 
 Because of the central role played in Jung’s theory of myth by the concepts of 
the collective unconscious and archetypes, developments in his thinking about these 
concepts have implications for his thinking about myth. Both concepts are 
controversial (Hauke 2006, Roesler 2012). In Jung’s basic understanding the 
collective unconscious designated ‘a second psychic system [in addition to 
consciousness and its “appendix”, the personal unconscious] of a collective, universal, 
and impersonal nature which is identical in all individuals’; and archetypes were the 
hypothetical, pre-existent factors, irrepresentable in themselves, that gave form to the 
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contents of the collective unconscious and expressed them in emotionally charged 
archetypal images or symbols (1936: par. 90; Stevens 2006). Perhaps Jung’s most 
important development of these ideas, duly noted by Segal (1998: 20), was the shift 
from a purely psychic conception to a psychophysical, or as Jung called it a 
‘psychoid’, conception of the collective unconscious and archetypes. This 
development was bound up with Jung’s reflections on the phenomenon and principle 
of synchronicity – ‘meaningful coincidence’ (1952c: par. 827), ‘an acausal connecting 
principle’ (1952c: title) – which proposed that psychic and physical events could 
sometimes be experienced as corresponding acausally through the meaning that they 
jointly expressed. An implication of this proposal was that psyche and matter could be 
seen as different aspects of an underlying, psychophysically unitary reality, which 
was also the realm of the archetypes (Jung 1955-56: par. 662). In Jung’s earlier 
model, in which the archetype was conceived as purely psychic, myths were 
exclusively viewed as projections of intrapsychic, albeit collective, contents onto the 
world. In Jung’s later model, however, in which the archetype was psychoid (capable 
of structuring the physical as well as the psychic), myths could on occasion 
additionally express themselves in the arrangement of external events (Jung 1952a: 
par. 648; 1976: 541; Main 2007: 63-79; 2013). 
 
Segal for the most part discusses Jung’s theory of myth as a typical twentieth-
century theory in that, with its psychological focus on revealing the unconscious 
mind, it makes myth compatible with science by being ‘other than explanatory’ of the 
physical world (2003b: 604). It thus satisfies Segal’s third criterion for bringing myth 
back to the world but fails to satisfy his second criterion. As for Segal’s first criterion, 
this also appears to be satisfied inasmuch as one of the common forms of imagery 
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through which Jung considered archetypes to express themselves was as ‘active 
personalities’ (1934/1954: par. 80), including as divine and heroic figures from 
mythology: modern individuals, he wrote, have been able ‘to rediscover the gods as 
psychic factors, that is, as archetypes of the unconscious’ (1934/1954: par. 50; see 
also 1936). It is true that these mythological figures are symbolic rather than literal, 
inasmuch as they express not actual divinities but archetypes. But Jung attributed 
divine qualities to the archetypes, above all the quality of being numinous: ‘the 
archetypes’ he wrote, ‘have, when they appear, a distinctly numinous character which 
can only be described as “spiritual”, if “magical” is too strong a word’ (1947/1954: 
par. 405). In an open letter responding to what he saw as a mischaracterization of his 
work by Martin Buber, he put the point even more vividly: 
 
I am aware that I am dealing with anthropomorphic ideas and not with actual 
gods and angels, although thanks to their specific energy [i.e., their being 
numinous], such (archetypal) images behave so autonomously that one could 
describe them metaphorically as “psychic daimonia” […] dangerous 
antagonists which can, among other things, work frightful devastation in the 
economy of the personality. They are everything one could wish for or fear in 
a psychic “Thou”’. (1952b: par. 1504)  
 
This certainly expresses the idea of causally effective divine personalities – though, as 
the repeated word ‘psychic’ makes clear, what are being described here in 




However, Segal also notes in his more extensive discussions of Jung’s theory 
of myth that the concept of synchronicity in certain respects moves that theory closer 
to concern with the physical world (1998: 20; 2003b: 613; 2008: 100-103). Segal 
illustrates his reflections about myth and synchronicity using Jung’s well-known case 
of a patient who was telling him her dream about being given a jewel in the form of a 
scarab beetle, when an actual scarabaeid beetle appeared at his consulting room 
window (1951: par. 982; 1952c pars. 843, 845). Of this case Jung later wrote to a 
correspondent: ‘at the moment my patient was telling me her dream a real “scarab” 
tried to get into the room, as if it had understood that it must play its mythological 
role as a symbol of rebirth’ (1976: 541). By way of substantiating the association of 
the scarab beetle with the motif of rebirth, Jung referred to ancient Egyptian culture, 
and in particular to the Book of What is in the Netherworld, where the symbol can 
readily be construed as carrying this meaning (1952c: par. 845). 
 
What Segal finds positive about this experience is how the acausal matching 
of dream and outer event impressed on the patient her ‘kinship’ with the physical 
world: ‘Rather than alien and indifferent to humans, the world proves to be akin to 
them – not because gods respond to human wishes or because human wishes directly 
affect the world but because human thoughts correspond to the nature of the world’ 
(2008: 102). The patient’s individual conscious attitude, which had fallen ‘out of 
sync’ with the world, was harmonized with the world again (2008: 101-102). The 
world thereby regained its meaningfulness for her, and that meaningfulness no longer 
depended on projection, for the meaningfulness that constitutes the connecting factor 
of a synchronicity is, by dint of the psychoid nature of the archetype, not just 
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intrapsychic but also ‘inherent in the world’ (2008: 102) – in the present case, in the 
timely behaviour of the scarabaeid beetle. 
 
Despite this positive assessment, however, Segal raises a number of questions 
about the alliance of myth and synchronicity. He asks what exactly is the 
‘mythological role’ of the beetle as a symbol of rebirth; whether there can be a myth 
of synchronicity, which for him would be a causal account of non-causality; whether 
the mythological associations of the beetle ‘really deal with the world’; and whether 
the myth of the rebirth of the scarab explains the appearance of the scarab or is merely 
invoked on the appearance of the scarab (Segal 2008: 102-103). I shall discuss each of 
these questions in turn, before then assessing the extent to which Jung’s theory of 
myth combined with his concept of synchronicity satisfies Segal’s criteria for 
bringing myth back to the world, whether in Segal’s view or in a different construal. 
 
First, what is the mythological role of the scarab beetle as a symbol of rebirth? 
In one of my own previously published discussions of myth and synchronicity (Main 
2007, revised as Main 2013), to which Segal’s most extensive discussion of these 
issues (2008) is partly responding, I focused on the same synchronistic experience 
with the scarab beetle. The context of my discussion was a consideration of 
disenchantment and re-enchantment and of the extent to which first Jung’s earlier 
theory of myth and then his later theory of myth, after he had developed his concept 
of synchronicity, could effect a restoration of ‘the sacred sense of wholeness and 
reconciliation between self and world’ (Scaff 2000: 105) that was assumed to have 
been lost as the world became progressively disenchanted (Main 2007: 19-22). For 
me, the mythological role of the scarab beetle as a symbol of rebirth was precisely to 
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express the archetypal idea of rebirth, in a manner that was, in its context, timely, 
numinous, gripping, and transformative. The transformation or rebirth that occurred 
was primarily the patient’s, inasmuch as the experience broke her out of her personal 
state of disenchantment (Main 2007: 23-24); but I argued that Jung, consciously or 
unconsciously, might have been hoping that the principle of synchronicity that the 
experience was illustrating would also contribute to a rebirth or transformation of 
disenchanted Western culture in general (Main 2007: 25, 27-28, 33-34). In all of this 
the role of the scarab beetle as a symbol of rebirth was simply to express the 
archetypal meaning. In light of the concept of synchronicity, the archetypal meaning 
could express itself to some extent in the configuration of outer events as well as in 
the configuration of inner events. But the role of the symbol, to express the archetypal 
meaning, was the same. 
 
Second, can there be a myth of synchronicity, which for Segal would be a 
causal account of non-causality? In my discussion of the scarab synchronicity I 
elaborated on various other possible meanings of the symbol of the scarab, some 
based on other aspects of ancient Egyptian culture, others based on Jung’s narratives 
about the symbol and his experiences of it in other contexts (Main 2007: 27-34). 
These meanings – which included creation, heroic rescue, and re-enchantment itself, 
in addition to rebirth – all seemed to me expressive of how Jung understood 
synchronicity and its potential significance for Western culture, and I suggested that 
Jung, perhaps unwittingly, might have chosen his example not, as he wrote, ‘simply to 
give some indication of how meaningful coincidences usually present themselves in 
practical life’ (1952c: par. 845), but to add emotional power to the presentation of his 
concept (Main 2007: 34). In any case, there seems to be no reason why ancient 
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narratives about the scarab beetle should not be seen as myths of synchronicity. It is 
not that the motif of the scarab beetle, with its mythological associations, causes the 
non-causal events of the synchronistic experience; rather, the motif expresses 
mythologically and symbolically aspects of the feature of reality that is designated 
more rationally by the concept of synchronicity, namely, the capacity for events to 
occur that are connected acausally through meaning. Nor is it difficult to think of 
other possible ‘myths of synchronicity’: myths of the relationship between microcosm 
and macrocosm, of the Anthropos, of Mercurius, and of magicians and seers might be 
examples. 
 
For the avoidance of doubt, the possibility of there being myths of 
synchronicity does not imply that synchronicity is itself myth, as Segal is careful to 
clarify (1998: 20; 2003b: 613; 2008: 102). Jung’s theory of myth remains about the 
expression of archetypes of the collective unconscious, and Jung nowhere suggests 
that synchronicity is an archetype. It may be that aspects of the nature of 
synchronicity can be expressed through archetypal and hence mythological images – 
for example, images relating to rebirth, creation, and re-enchantment – but 
synchronicity itself is presented by Jung as something more fundamental than an 
archetype: it is a ‘connecting principle’ (1952c: title) and ‘principle of explanation’ 
(1952c: par. 819). Nor, by the same token, is it the case that ‘synchronicity constitutes 
“myth beyond projection”’ (Segal 2008: 102). The phrase ‘myth beyond projection’, 
for which I am to blame (2007: 25-26; 2013: 135-136), refers not to synchronicity but 
to a possible not-purely-intrapsychic way of viewing myths that arises when Jung’s 
theory of myth is allied with his concept of synchronicity. 
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Third, do the mythological associations of the scarab beetle in Jung’s example 
really deal with the world? In the case of the scarab beetle, Segal suggests, even if 
there is a rebirth, moment of creation, or heroic rescue taking place in relation to 
Jung’s patient or, more broadly, Western culture in general, the transformation 
involved occurs within the patient’s or, more broadly, humanity’s unconscious side, 
with the external events being merely ancillary to this intrapsychic individual or 
collective transformation: as Segal puts it, ‘the outer world is a mere steppingstone to 
the inner one’ (2008: 102). Such a view seems to be supported by Jung’s account of 
the scarab incident: ‘The dream alone’, Jung related, ‘was enough to disturb ever so 
slightly the rationalistic attitude of my patient. But when the “scarab” came flying in 
through the window in actual fact, her natural being could burst through the armour of 
her animus possession and the process of transformation could at last begin to move’ 
(1952c: par. 845). Here the parallel physical event enhanced a meaning arguably 
already present in the dream symbol and magnified its effect; but the effect was still 
primarily a psychological one. 
 
Again, however, Jung’s theory of myth does not purport to deal directly with 
the outer world. It deals with archetypes. The connection to the outer world stems 
from Jung’s revised view of archetypes as psychoid, that is, as factors that are neither 
psychic nor physical but are capable of ordering both psyche and matter and of 
expressing themselves in either or both domains (Main 2014: 225-226). Synchronistic 
experiences acausally connect inner psychic events with outer physical ones. The 
most accurate description might therefore be that it deals with the psychophysical 
world. Even in those synchronistic experiences where the focus appears to be 
primarily on the psychic world, as in the incident with the scarab beetle, the physical 
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world is also necessarily and substantively involved. Jung described his patient as 
having been ‘steeped in Cartesian philosophy’, to which she ‘clung […] rigidly’ 
(1952c: par. 845). The rationalism and sharp separation between mind and matter 
implied by this description were, in Jung’s account, undone by the synchronistic 
experience. Psychologically, this was beneficial for the patient’s personal 
development. But it also seems to have been relevant physically, inasmuch as it 
brought about a shift in her view of the physical world, which she had witnessed as 
being not after all so sharply separated from her psychic world but, in some 
‘unexpected and irrational’ (1952c: par. 845) way, connected to it. 
 
In contrast to this incident, there are other synchronistic events where the 
focus appears to be primarily on the physical world. Yet in these too the real matter 
dealt with turns out to be psychophysical. One of Jung’s favourite accounts of how an 
activated archetype could be accompanied by synchronistic ‘effects’ in the physical 
environment is the myth-like, though reportedly real-life, story of the rainmaker of 
Kiaochou. Summoned to a drought-stricken region, the rainmaker retired to a hut 
where he meditated until he had brought himself ‘in Tao’ (in Jungian terms, had 
connected with the archetype of the self), whereupon, narrated Jung, ‘naturally the 
rain came’ (1955-56: par. 640n211). It was perhaps with such an incident in mind that 
Jung, in his letter describing how the scarab beetle had had to ‘play its mythological 
role as a symbol of rebirth’, continued: ‘Even inanimate objects behave occasionally 
in the same way – meteorological phenomena, for instance’ (1976: 541). At any rate, 
while the dénouement of this anecdote is the physical event of the rainfall, no less 
necessary and substantive in it is the psychic state of the rainmaker’s being in Tao. 
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What the event is really dealing with is the nature of psychophysical reality, that is, in 
this case, the acausal relationship between inner psychic and outer physical order. 
 
The fourth question Segal raised about the alliance of myth and synchronicity 
is: does the myth of the rebirth of the scarab explain the appearance of the scarab, or 
is it merely being invoked on the appearance of the scarab? If the myth does not 
explain the appearance of the scarab, then for Segal ‘the myth may lie more in the 
background than in the foreground’ and accordingly ‘Myth […] may not yet be fully 
back in the world’ (2008: 103). In response to this, it can be noted that the question 
assumes that explanations must be causal. Yet Jung introduced the concept of 
synchronicity precisely as a form of explanation that was non-causal. The possibility 
of non-causal explanations, while not a mainstream view among either scientists or 
philosophers, is not inherently absurd and has recently been attracting increasing 
interest among philosophers of science (Lange 2017; Reutlinger and Saatsi 2018). For 
his part, Jung argued that the occurrence, in subatomic physics as well as in 
psychological experience, of events that, it seemed, could not be explained in causal 
terms, necessitated the postulation of ‘another principle of explanation’ (1952c: par. 
819). Synchronicity – acausal connection through meaning – was, for him, this other 
principle of explanation. It explained not by identifying the causes of events but by 
disclosing the pattern of meaning (for Jung, invariably archetypal meaning) expressed 
by a set of events. Jung would not dispute that the appearance of the physical scarab 
had its own chain of efficient causes, and the patient’s dream of the scarab jewellery 
likewise. What he wished to explain was not either of those events individually but 
the psychophysical event of their meaningful coincidence, and for this he felt he 
needed to appeal to a non-causal principle of explanation. 
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The question of whether myth explains a synchronistic event is bound up with 
questions of intent, agency, and personalization, which for Segal are requirements of a 
mythic account of an event. He stresses that synchronicity achieves its benefits  
‘without […] personality’ (1998: 20), ‘without personalization’ (2008: 102). It is true 
that there is, by definition, no intentional agent, hence no personality divine or 
otherwise, causing a synchronicity; a synchronicity by definition is an acausal event. 
But for Jung the synchronistic dimension of a mythic event, such as the appearance of 
the scarab beetle, is independent of any causal effect it may have. An archetypal 
motif, such as rebirth, here symbolized by the scarab beetle, may emerge 
synchronistically in the physical and psychic environments, but any causal effect that 
the presence of that emerged archetype then has is independent of – as it were, 
complementary and orthogonal to – its synchronistic appearance. Having emerged 
synchronistically, the archetype can then have causal effects, including ones that 
could be expressed in personalized form, just as an archetypal figure that emerged 
purely psychologically in a dream could affect the dreamer. In short, synchronicity 
does not independently contribute personalization to an experience, but neither does it 
undo the personalization that might already exist by dint of an experience’s being 
archetypal.  
 
We are now in a position to assess the extent to which Jung’s theory of myth 
when allied with his concept of synchronicity satisfies Segal’s criteria for bringing 
myth back to the world. Segal himself offers a positive overall appraisal: ‘With 
synchronicity’, he states, ‘Jungian psychology offers an extraordinary vehicle for 
carrying myth back to the world – and without leaving science behind’ (2008: 102). 
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He argues that Jung’s theory of myth, when allied with his concept of synchronicity, 
achieves a closer connection with the physical world through fostering a sense of, as 
he puts it, ‘at-homeness’ in the world, thereby providing ‘an existential benefit 
comparable with that offered by myth’ (1998: 20).  Focusing on synchronicity as a 
phenomenon – ‘an entirely empirical matter […] the sheer parallel between us and the 
world’ (2010: 374) – rather than as a principle of explanation, he seems to accept the 
compatibility of synchronicity with modern science. 
 
However, against the criteria that Segal used to test the theories of myth based 
on the perspectives of Lévi-Strauss, Lovelock, and Winnicott Jung’s theory of myth 
allied with synchronicity does not seem to fare so well. The third criterion, 
compatibility with modern science, might be satisfied, but there are, as we have seen, 
serious question marks for Segal over the first and second criteria. In at least two of 
his discussions (1998: 20; 2008: 102) he emphasizes that the benefits brought to 
Jung’s theory of myth by its alliance with synchronicity are at the expense of 
promoting a picture that is ‘without personality’ or ‘without personalization’. He also 
questions whether in Jung’s theory of myth when allied with synchronicity the mythic 
content causes anything (2008: 102). Taken together, these seem to be serious 
stumbling blocks to satisfying the first criterion of involving causally effective divine 
personalities. Again, he questions whether Jung’s theory of myth allied with 
synchronicity actually provides an explanation of the physical component of a 
synchronicity, such as the appearance of the real scarab in Jung’s example (2008: 
102-103). This would amount to a conspicuous failure to satisfy the second criterion 
of explaining the physical world. 
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I have suggested that it might be possible to make a stronger case for Jung’s 
approach. The key to doing so would be to focus on the decisive element of Jung’s 
theory of myth, the role of archetypes, and the crucial revision that Jung made to this 
element in light of, or as a part of, his concept of synchronicity, namely, his 
characterization of archetypes as psychoid. Once Jung had conceived of the 
archetypes as psychoid, that is, as factors that can order physical as well as psychic 
reality, then claims he had made for the archetypes as psychic factors might also, in 
some form, also apply in the physical world. In relation to the first of Segal’s criteria 
for bringing myth back to the world, this might mean that events in the physical world 
could, on occasion, behave in ways that seemed mythological, as if imbued with 
numinosity, intent, and personality: that is, expressing causally effective divine 
personality. The behaviour itself would be an expression of the archetypes; its 
appearance in physical as well as psychic contexts would be a manifestation of 
synchronicity. 
 
In relation to the second of Segal’s criteria – that myth should explain the 
physical world – there are two ways in which this might be satisfied. One way again 
involves the archetype conceived as psychoid. Insofar as such an archetype, by dint of 
its psychoid nature, resulted in effects in the physical world, the archetype would be 
part of (unlikely the whole of) the explanation of those events. This would be a causal 
explanation, albeit one in which the cause was of an unusual nature, neither 
straightforwardly physical nor straightforwardly psychic. The other way in which 
myth allied with synchronicity could explain events in the physical world is by 
disclosing the pattern of archetypal meaning that those events jointly expressed with 
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the psychic events with which they were acausally connected. This would be a non-
causal or acausal form of explanation. 
 
In relation to the third of Segal’s criteria, there is no reason why Jung’s theory 
of myth allied with synchronicity should not remain compatible with modern science. 
Jung certainly intended that it should. His concepts of the archetype and the collective 
unconscious, to say nothing of the psychoid archetype and synchronicity, are clearly 
all pushing at and beyond the boundaries of currently established science, and as such 
are scientifically highly questionable. But Jung wished only to broaden, not to reject, 
modern science, as Segal acknowledges (2003b: 597). One of the many questions that 
remains is whether that envisaged broadening could even in principle be 
accomplished within the physicalist metaphysics that dominated the sciences in 
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